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INDUSTRIAL IMPORTANCE OF NONMETALLIC MINERALS

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It is an unfortunate coincidence that the word "mining" to most people in the Pacific Northwest means only metal mining, and, to many people, only gold mining. This heritage from the pioneer days of mining in the West is perhaps natural, but it may become dangerously detrimental to the proper development of the mineral resources of the Pacific Northwest.

As a matter of fact, the value of the annual production of nonmetallic minerals in Oregon is greater than that of the metals. In 1940, the most recent year of peak production of gold, silver, copper, and lead in Oregon, the total value of these metals produced was a little over $4 million. Quicksilver production, in 1940, very nearly a peak year, was valued at about $1.6 million. The total for all metals was a little under $5.7 million. The total for the nonmetallics was about $5.75 million. In 1945, the Oregon total for all metals had dropped to $680,000, while the total value of nonmetallic minerals in this ame period was $8.7 million or roughly thirteen times the value of metals produced. With the resumption of gold production late in 1945, metal-mineral production will undoubtedly increase again in Oregon; but F. W. Libbey, director of the Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries, also anicipates a much larger increase in the production of nonmetallics.

In the state of Washington, where metal production is greater than in Oregon, Sheldon L. Glover, supervisor of the Division of Geology and Mines, has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the nonmetallic minerals and his belief that the future growth of the mining industry in that state will, in large part, be due to increased development of nonmetallic mineral production. In California, in 1944, the total value of all metal production was about $24 million, while the total value of nonmetallic minerals (excluding petroleum, coal, and natural gas) was about $62.3 million.

These figures illustrate both the importance and the unmistakable upward trend of nonmetallic-mineral production on the Pacific Coast. No survey of mining possibilities of the Pacific Northwest can be at all adequate which ignores the nonmetallic minerals.

This mineral production is not only important in tonnage, value, and employment of labor; it is also highly important and significant in the industrial growth and well being of the area. Industrial minerals include such

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CHINA TRADE

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The China market today remains much as it has always been in the eyes of American commercial men—potentially rich but presently unattainable. Traditionally, American China policy has been primarily concerned with securing economic objectives. Even now, when greater emphasis is being placed upon strategic and political considerations than upon economic ends in the formulation of foreign policy, the China policy of the United States continues to follow the modalities developed during the century and a half of contact with China. Consequently, at the moment, the seeking of commercial opportunity in China and foreign policy toward China are not in contradiction; at the same time, there is little indication that there will be immediate realization of commercial opportunity through the application of that policy.

Two general conditions must be satisfied if China is to furnish a sizeable market outlet in the future. Peace at least, if not complete unity, must prevail for some considerable time in order to re-establish a sounder economy; and China must remain free of foreign domination. The recent announcement of withdrawal of American troops does not solve the basic dilemma that has faced the United States. American troops in China gave the Chinese Communists and the U.S.S.R. a rallying cry of American imperialism; the withdrawal of American troops from China and the collapse of the truce-team agreements make very possible a long civil war and Russian aid to the Chinese Communist forces.

Internal disorder and the threat of foreign domination have been the two major problems with which the China policy of the United States has been concerned since the signing of the first Sino-American treaty in 1844. It is these two problems that shaped the specific historical doctrine known as the "open door" policy. Properly understood, the "open door" policy may be defined as an attempt to secure economic opportunity in the Chinese market for American nationals. To this end, it has envisaged a China orderly enough to prevent both unilateral exploitation of her economic resources and strategically threatening political domination.

The methods used to further these objectives of the China policy may be placed roughly in three categories. First, the American government sought to anticipate the possible granting of exclusive privileges by China

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to other foreign powers by securing, or trying to secure, general agreement to the idea of maintenance of equal opportunity. In the implementation of this policy, the two additional categories emerged. Support of the principle of the preservation of and respect for the administrative and territorial integrity of China became the chief weapon of the United States in preventing other powers from obtaining positions of an exclusive nature from the Chinese. The corollary to this was inevitable. The United States, being unwilling until involved in World War II to use force to guard the integrity of China (and then only as a secondary consideration), evolved the technique of assisting China to develop and maintain an effective and stable government.

An analysis of the application of the "open door" policy up to 1941 reveals the consistency, if not the successful realization, of its objectives. The worst that can be said for the policy is that the United States eventually was involved in a Far Eastern war. The best that can be said is that the United States never saw China completely under the control of a foreign power to the permanent exclusion of American opportunity.

The end of World War II saw renewed interest in the possibility of taking advantage of the China market. Eight years of blockade, in addition to the demands of war, had emptied China of most of her consumers' goods as well as her capital equipment. There could be no question of the demand existing if means of payment could be devised. In addition, Japan had been eliminated, and, with the rest of the world occupied with rehabilitation, Great Britain appeared as the only immediate economic competitor; and even British competition was not a serious prospect. In view of certain natural advantages of geography and the historical attitudes of the Chinese, the attraction of the China market became even stronger than before to Americans.

As it has developed, however, there have been certain factors in the Chinese situation operating against sudden large-scale realization of commercial opportunities by American businessmen. Political instability, official venality, and economic chaos make commercial undertakings in China even more speculative than in prewar days. The gaining of treaty equality, whereby China has control of her own tariff policy and whereby American nationals and American business firms no longer operate under the advantages of extraterritoriality but under Chinese laws, has created an atmosphere of uncertainty concerning how these new conditions will affect life and business in China.

In addition, the Chinese government has indicated a policy of state control over a considerable portion of Chinese economic activity. A limited amount of capital available for the purchase of foreign goods, plus tremendous buying pressure created by the lack of almost every type of consumers' goods, has caused restrictions to be placed on foreign purchases to prevent the drainage of Chinese credit by the purchase of nonessential goods. Priority has been given to capital equipment so that China can start a long-range program of gaining greater self-sufficiency and combating inflation. Purchases in almost every category need governmental approval.

Fluctuation in currency rates, lack of mooring facilities, lack of protected wharfages, and general social unrest further handicap conservative commercial transactions.

It is in relation to the foregoing conditions that the present China policy of the United States must be analyzed. Is it designed to promote peace and stability within China? Is it designed to keep China from falling under Russian domination to the exclusion of American opportunity? To answer these questions, we must examine recent Sino-American relations.

The United States became involved in Chinese internal politics through military necessity during World War II. The Chinese Communist struggle against the Kuomintang government had been going on intermittently since 1933. In 1944, military men saw the necessity of healing this breach if any large-scale offensive against the Japanese was to be undertaken from the China mainland. The United States was placed in an awkward position, however, because the one-party Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek was the government that was legally recognized by the United States. To ask that government to share power wi a faction that it considered rebellious was embarrassing. The sense of embarrassment was not all on the side of the United States, however. China was allied with the democracies in their fight against fascism. Whatever China chose to call her system, the truth of the matter was that she herself had a one-party totalitarian government that denied civil liberties and practiced ruthless thought suppression in the best Fascist tradition. For a while, however, it appeared that the United States would be able to bring about a *rapproachement* between the two disputants.

Up to 1945, Russia had followed a rigidly neutral policy in the Chinese civil war, recognizing the government of Chiang Kai-shek and giving little support, material or moral, to the Chinese Communist Party. (As a matter of fact, during the period of America's participation in the war, the public pronouncements of the Chinese Communist leaders seemed to indicate that they expected more aid from the United States than from Russia in their struggle both against Japan and the Kuomintang. Certainly, at that time they were not publicly antidemocratic, but identified their cause more with democracy than with socialism.) Russian and American policy until the war's end were parallel—the utilization of a united China to the greatest possibl extent in the war against Japan.

With the sudden termination of the war, however, the situation quickly changed. The first obligation of the United States was the disarming and repatriation of Japanese troops. The Kuomintang was the recog-

nized government of China. Furthermore, Chiang Kai-shek had promised the granting of a democratic base to his government. The United States gave means of transportation to the Kuomintang which allowed the Nationalist troops to occupy the strategic coastal areas that otherwise would have fallen to the Chinese Communist army. American troops stayed in key areas. At once, the Chinese Communist Party began denouncing the American action as intervention on the side of the Kuomintang. (Whether our motives were disinterested and objective or not, there could be no other way of construing the action.) Russia construed American activity in China as being aimed at the security of Russia in North Asia. Consequently, Russia began to give active moral and, in the case of Manchuria, a measure of material support to the Chinese Communist Party. Where, in 1945, there had been open admiration on the part of the Chinese Communist leaders for the United States, in 1946 there was nothing but bitterness and hostility. A bond had been forged between Russia and the Chinese Communist Party. Anti-American demonstrations, Communist-inspired, began to appear in Chinese cities. It seemed that China was to become another Spain—a battleground of foreign countries' power politics.

In the midst of all this, General Marshall labored long and patiently to resolve the Kuomintang-Communist conflict and to establish in China a more-democratic form of government. By his truce teams' activities, he was able to stave off actual civil war for the period of his mission. But in the end he was forced to admit failure. He could not bring about a coalition government in which the Kuomintang would share power with the Chinese Communist Party.

After General Marshall had been made Secretary of State, one of his first steps was to announce the withdrawal of American troops from China. In this he adopted a realistic attitude. The presence of 18,000 American troops was serving no great purpose, and they were an irritant to both the Chinese Communists and the Russians. Their continued presence could only result in a loss, in considerable measure, of the good will which the United States has always possessed in greater degree than any other country in China, an asset that could have economic value if the Chinese market were ever to be developed. While the removal of American troops from China seemingly left the field open to Russia, actually the presence of 18,000 men against the million men that Russia has available in the Far East could gain little. Thus, if it must be admitted that Russia and the United States are engaged in a power struggle in the Far East, Russia can better be restrained, and with more logic on the side of the United States, through direct agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, inside or outside of the United Nations structure, than through the presence of a handful of American combat troops in China.

There can be little doubt that China, and all Asia for that matter, is in the throes of an economic, social, and political revolution. The present one-party Kuomintang government in China is a barrier to that revolution. The action of the United States will determine whether this revolution will draw its strength from Communist ideology or whether it can be contained within the framework of a democratic movement as we understand it. Since the end of the war, unfortunately, the Chinese Communist Party has been able to point to American action as intervention on the side of the reactionary Kuomintang. The withdrawal of American troops in February could silence such criticism if subsequent action shows sympathy for the establishment of more democratic rule in China. Economic aid to China now stands as the chief weapon of the United States. It remains to be seen whether or not it will be used to bring about a loosening of the influence of the reactionaries within the Kuomintang and a chance for more-democratic elements to come out from their underground where they have been driven by the government. Small as this non-Communist democratic group may be, any hope for the future seems to center on it. It would be unfortunate for all if China were forced to decide between the Kuomintang and Communism. General Marshall, on his departure from Nanking, expressed this thought when he said that the reactionaries in the Kuomintang were driving the true democrats into the ranks of the Communists because of the lack of a middle ground.

The revolution will not be denied for long, but it can be channeled. Economic, social, and political revolutions do not have to be synonymous with Communism, nor do they have to be antithetical to democracy—unless our own history has turned into a mockery.

The actual realization of a rich China market remains a hope of the future. If peace can be established in China by means of a democratic government that will do away with the monopolistic position of the Kuomintang and yet not be committed to follow the Russian star, then conditions will become sufficiently stable so that the Chinese market may be a source of profit to American business. Such a contingency, however, is not likely in the forseeable future.

In the meantime, our China policy will probably try to stand guard, as it has done in the past, to see that China does not come under foreign domination. The best that can be hoped for at the moment is that the market, although still potential, will be there if and when internal peace does come to China.

INDUSTRIAL IMPORTANCE OF NONMETALLIC MINERALS

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essential rocks, minerals, and mineral products as Portland cement, limestone and lime, building stone, sand and gravel, clays for brick and tile, sewer pipe, electrical insulators, chinaware and porcelain, as well as more highly specialized minerals such as diatomaceous earth, pumice, asbestos, barytes, perlite, and bentonite.

All construction activities such as highways, bridges,

dams, piers, and building and machine foundations must have cement, lime, crushed stone, sand and gravel, brick and tile. Agriculture needs not only these structural materials but also drain tile, limestone and lime, phosphates, potash salts, etc. Metallurgical industries need refractory brick, limestone and siliceous fluxes, graphite and carbon electrodes. The list could be expanded almost indefinitely. These seemingly prosaic materials are as essential to our everyday living as they are to industrial development and manufacturing.

While metals are also essential—often vital—to our economy, their production per dollar value of annual output needs relatively few men. Compare the employment created by the production of $1 million of gold with that of $1 million of Portland cement. While it is very desirable to have important local production of metals, it is in many cases not so essential as it is to have local production of some of the nonmetallic minerals. There are no workable copper or zinc deposits in New England but, nevertheless, Bridgeport, Connecticut is a very large producer of brass and brass products.

In some instances the development of industrial-mineral deposits must await the development of local or nearby markets—for example, Portland cement; in other cases the availability of low-cost material of high quality attracts new industries. An excellent example of this is limestone and lime. A host of industries are either based on lime or use it as an essential raw material. Calcium carbide for acetylene manufacture must have low-cost, high-quality lime, plus carbon. Cheap raw materials make cheap carbide possible; cheap carbide means cheap acetylene and acetylene is the basis for a very large group of organic products. During World War II Germany, lacking petroleum, used acetylene as the starting point for making synthetic rubber and a great variety of organic chemical products.

A detailed study was made a few years ago by Keller and Quirke (*Ind. and Engineering Chemistry,* vol. 17, pp. 444-445) of the relative importance of minerals in the chief industrial-chemical and process industries. Their list graded 34 minerals or ores based on use frequency. Water (used as a raw material) leads the list with an index number of 99. Bismuth, silver, and titanium, each with an index of 1, were the last three. Nonmetallic minerals and fuels had a total of 21 materials listed; metallic ores totaled 13. Of the first 15 in importance (index numbers 99 down to 9) 14 were nonmetallic minerals and only 1 (lead ores) was metallic. All minerals higher than 10 in use frequency were nonmetallic minerals.

Industries are rarely established in new locations because of any one single favorable factor. One factor may be unusually favorable, such as cheap power, but enough other factors must also be favorable to make an economically sound and attractive picture. The presence or absence of a single raw material may not make or break a new development. If most factors are favorable and one essential raw material cannot be found locally, there is no reason why it should not be found elsewhere and brought into the area.

Since most industries need both natural raw materials, such as limestone, and manufactured raw materials such as limestone, and manufactured raw materials, product of one industry may be a raw material for a other industry, all industries are more or less interlocking. Thus the industrial growth and health of an area are greatly helped by a wide diversification of types of industry. Some new industries may depend almost wholly on nonlocal raw materials (and every assistance should be given to locate such materials), but their finished products may be just the raw materials needed for other new industries which will provide new markets for local mineral products. Soda ash, made in Oregon, probably would use salt from California; but soda ash is needed for glass making, and silica for glass can be produced cheaply in the Northwest. The Pedersen process, or a modification of it, which may be used by the Aluminum Company of America for producing alumina and iron from the Oregon laterite ores, will need the limestone which is being developed in Alaska and will also need soda ash; but it will open up the large Oregon laterite deposits and will produce local alumina which could be used, in addition to making aluminum, for making electric furnace abrasives and refractories, alumina chemicals, etc.

All of this leads to the conclusion that increased production of the nonmetallic minerals in the Pacific Northwest will be both a cause and a result of increased industrial and population growth of the area. Known reserves of metallic minerals in Oregon may not be large, but mineral production will continue to grow, largely in the industrial-mineral field.

OCCUPATION AND AMUSEMENT TAXES IN OREGON CITIES

In their search for local sources of revenue to supplement the property tax, an increasing number of Oregon cities have during recent years broadened their coverage of license ordinances and imposed occupational and amusement taxes. In 1937, only 5 cities in Oregon had comprehensive occupational taxes, while at the present time 17 cities tax a number of businesses within the city, in addition to those which require special regulation or inspection. A recent analysis of the general revenues of Oregon cities for the fiscal years 1934 and 1943-44 shows that revenues from licenses, occupational taxes, and amusement taxes have increased from $341,137 or 3.4 per cent of the general revenues of all cities in 1934 to $928,535 or 5.8 per cent in 1943-44. This trend has continued during the past two years.

Of the sixty-five cities with more than 1,000 population which completed and returned questionnaires, sent out by the University of Oregon Bureau of Municipal Research and Service, only one, West Salem, levies no business or amusement license fee or tax. Of the 113 cities that returned the questionnaire, 52 are levying both business and amusement license fees and taxes, 4 limit their fees to business only, and 41 license or tax

only amusements. A distribution of the 113 cities according to the type of fees imposed follows:

Population Group	Both Business and Amusement	Business Only	No Business or Amusement: Amusements Only	No Business or Amusement: Tax or License	No. Cities Reporting
Over 5,000	15	----	1	----	16
2,500 to 5,000	16	----	3	----	19
1,000 to 2,500	13	----	16	1	30
500 to 1,000	5	----	11	3	19
Under 500	3	4	10	12	29
Total	52	4	41	16	113

It has long been the practice of most of the larger and many of the smaller cities of Oregon to license businesses and occupations which require inspection or regulation in the interests of public health, safety, or morals. Every city in the state probably has authority to impose license fees sufficient to defray the cost of such inspection or regulation.

Express charter authority is, however, necessary before an Oregon city may levy a business or occupational tax for revenue purposes. Such authority cannot be implied from the city's police powers. Two Oregon cases, *Lent* vs. *Portland*, 42 Or. 488, and *Abrahamson* vs. *Roseburg*, 55 Or. 359, have ruled on the authority necessary for the levy of a tax for revenue purposes. In the Roseburg case, a charter provision authorizing the city council to "license, tax, and regulate" certain specified occupations and to "license and regulate" any and all other occupations within the city was held to provide adequate authority for imposing business and occupational taxes for revenue purposes. A general grant of powers provides the same authority.

Most of the business and occupational taxes now being levied by Oregon cities are on a flat-rate basis for various business classifications. In a few cities, the rates on selected businesses are based on some measure of capacity or the amount of business done. Fees for hotels and rooming houses, for example, vary in several cities in proportion to the number of rooms available. Seating capacity is sometimes the measure for the tax on several kinds of amusement places—principally motion-picture theaters and night clubs. At least one city taxes its businesses on the basis of the number of employees engaged in the business. Some cities tax certain amusement devices on the basis of gross receipts.

Flat business and occupational taxes and fees of fixed dollar amounts, such as are commonly imposed by Oregon cities, produce less revenue than rate schedules which vary with the volume of business transacted. Where the flat-rate tax is used, the rate for each classification can be no higher than reasonable for the smallest-volume business in the classification. Furthermore, a flat-rate schedule fails to produce increased city revenues during periods of price and population increases which expand the volume of business transactions, except as new enterprises are established. A flat-rate schedule is also regressive, in that it places the greatest relative burden on the smallest business in any particular classification.

The need for increased revenues to meet increased costs and to provide services to an increased population has, during the past few years, led many cities in the United States to abandon their flat-rate business and occupational tax schedule and to substitute a schedule of rates that varies according to some measure of the volume of business. Thus, some cities base their business taxes on the number of employees engaged in the business, others on the gross receipts or on the quantity produced. Business taxes have been imposed on some types of businesses on the basis of the number of vehicles used.

A business tax based on net income (that is, on gross income less expenses incurred to create that income) or on value added (that is on total receipts of the business less cost of raw materials, goods, and services purchased from other business, as proposed by the Oregon Tax Study Commission) would undoubtedly provide the most equitable type of business and occupational tax. Because this type of tax would be difficult to administer at the municipal level, cities have instead adopted business taxes based on gross receipts but differentiating the rate schedules imposed on various types of businesses roughly according to the ratio of net income to gross receipts. Thus, wholesale businesses are taxed at a low rate and retail businesses and professions at higher rates. Similarly, since the margin of profits varies considerably among different retail businesses, these businesses are sometimes classified and taxed at different rates. The cities of Oregon have over a period years largely substituted this method in levying franchise fees to replace the flat-rate franchise fee that was formerly imposed on public utilities under private ownership, but are still largely using flat-rate schedules in taxing businesses and occupations.—University of Oregon Bureau of Municipal Research and Service, *Information Bulletin*, No. 64, Oct. 1946.

There is a definite trend toward greater interest in outdoor sports. Over a million dollars has been received in admissions for one baseball world series, and the gate receipts at a single world championship prize fight have exceeded $2.5 million. On the average, 12 million people pay $40 million weekly to watch football during the season, while annual horse and dog racing receipts are twice as large.

There were 37.3 million dwelling units in the United States in 1940—more than double the 17.9 million in 1900. Occupancy per unit was one person less. But more than 40 per cent of our homes in 1940 needed to be replaced or rehabilitated.

Almost 40 per cent of the land area of the United States receives too little rainfall for safe general agriculture, but only 3 per cent of this area is now being irrigated.

Food is by far the most important item in the consumer budget, constituting about 29 per cent of the nation's consumption expenditures.

CURRENT BUSINESS TRENDS IN OREGON

BANK DEBITS

Bank debits represent the dollar value of the checks drawn against individual bank deposits. Approximately 90 per cent of all goods, property, and services is paid for by check. Bank debits are regarded as indicators of the general trend of business, though their value for this purpose may be impaired by substantial changes in the general level of prices. The Bureau of Business Research collects bank debits from 92 banks and branches monthly. On occasion, the totals for the same month in different issues of the *Review* are not directly comparable because of necessary adjustments in basic data.

Marketing Districts	*Number of Banks Reporting*	*Debits Jan. 1947*	*Debits Dec. 1946*	*Debits Jan. 1946*	*Jan. 1947 compared with Dec. 1946*	*Jan. 1947 compared with Jan. 1946*
Oregon	86	$861,648,372	$871,246,081	$691,624,889	— 1.2%	+24.6%
Portland (Portland, Hillsboro, Oregon City, etc.)	26	560,661,116	569,267,016	450,381,494	— 3.3	+22.3
Lower Willamette Valley (Salem, McMinnville, etc.)	9	71,669,231	64,678,607	59,406,165	+10.8	+20.6
Upper Willamette Valley (Albany, Corvallis, Eugene, etc.)	9	68,376,888	67,570,512	54,103,521	+ 1.2	+26.4
North Oregon Coast (Astoria, Tillamook, etc.)	4	17,046,004	17,353,288	13,953,309	— 1.8	+22.2
Douglas, Coos Bay	5	20,238,019	19,528,775	14,686,769	+ 3.6	+37.8
Southern Oregon (Ashland, Medford, Grants Pass)	5	37,558,572	34,941,828	25,000,393	+ 7.5	+50.2
Upper Columbia River (The Dalles, Hood River, etc.)	6	16,779,492	15,357,962	11,804,375	+ 9.3	+42.1
Pendleton area	6	18,690,304	16,569,269	15,181,267	+12.8	+23.1
Central Oregon (Bend, Prineville, Redmond)	3	9,578,736	9,717,994	6,815,027	— 1.4	+40.5
Klamath Falls, Lakeview area	4	25,973,861	30,488,486	21,557,032	—14.8	+20.5
Baker, La Grande area	6	16,606,286	16,229,147	12,429,197	+ 2.3	+33.6
Burns, Ontario, Nyssa	3	8,469,863	9,543,197	6,306,340	—11.3	+34.3

RETAIL SALES

The sales of a state-wide sample of 439 independent retail stores, collected by the Bureau of the Census, give an indication of trading activity and retail distribution. These figures are often interpreted as indicating purchasing power.

BY MARKETING DISTRICT

	Jan. 1947 compared with Dec. 1946	*Jan. 1947 compared with Jan. 1946*
Oregon	—27.2%	+36.7%
Portland	—31.6	+29.3
Lower Willamette Valley	— 1.8	+51.1
Upper Willamette Valley	—28.2	+38.0
North Oregon Coast	+ 4.5	+72.9
Douglas, Coos Bay	— 2.6	+41.6
Southern Oregon	—13.3	+40.1
Upper Columbia River	+ 7.9	+110.1
Pendleton	—31.2	+17.4
Central Oregon	—43.5	+ 8.3
Klamath Falls, Lakeview	—37.6	+39.8
Baker, La Grande	— 5.1	+52.7
Burns, Ontario	—25.9	+21.4

BY TYPE OF OUTLET

	Jan. 1947 compared with Dec. 1946	*Jan. 1947 compared with Jan. 1946*
Oregon	—27.2%	+36.7%
Department stores	—47.5	+20.8
Food Stores	— 7.2	+12.5
Eating and drinking establishments	— 5.2	— 2.4
Drug stores	—35.2	+ 5.5
Apparel stores	—48.5	+ 9.6
Motor-vehicle dealers	+21.1	+156.8
Furniture, household, radio	—24.2	+24.4
Lumber, building, hardware	— 8.8	+22.7

BUILDING PERMITS

Building permits give an indication of building operations planned rather than actual construction under way. Care must be taken, in interpreting these data, to allow for the lag which may elapse between the issuance of the permit and the beginning of actual construction. The data have been collected by the Bureau of Business Research.

	New Residential Jan. 1947	*New Nonresidential Jan. 1947*	*Additions, Alterations & Repairs Jan. 1947*	*Totals Jan. 1947*	*Totals Dec. 1946*	*Totals Jan. 1946*
Albany	$ 67,550	$ 14,700	$ 4,350	$ 86,600	$ 61,700	$ 30,350
Astoria	36,600	1,300	8,605	46,505	28,450	32,875
Baker	2,000	5,000	2,100	9,100	3,450	9,500
Bend	43,750	7,100	14,440	65,290	19,955	54,725
Corvallis	17,000	23,000	4,650	44,650	25,150	78,975
Eugene	53,400	24,150	25,645	103,195	180,795	214,098
Klamath Falls	11,000	1,150	11,835	23,985	37,771	69,826
La Grande	11,500	400	1,500	13,400	6,970	1,295
Oregon City	4,800	15,000	5,395	25,195	10,850	46,300
Pendleton	0	1,750	7,700	9,450	49,350	147,100
Portland	999,250	2,102,235	487,575	3,589,060	2,300,985	2,623,690
Salem	39,600	39,125	28,263	106,988	132,360	461,271
The Dalles	44,500	450	6,050	51,000	16,415	223,089
20 other communities	240,500	97,775	59,950	398,225	255,135	629,334
Total	$1,571,450	$2,333,135	$ 668,058	$4,572,643	$3,079,336	$4,622,428

OREGON MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT

(Source: San Francisco Regional Office, Bureau of Labor Statistics)

Industry	*Dec. 1946*	*Nov. 1946*	*Dec. 1945*
All manufacturing, total	118,400	119,100	108,400
Lumber & timber basic products	59,400	58,900	39,200
Furniture & finished lumber products	6,300	6,400	5,700
Iron, steel & their products	4,200	4,100	3,500
Transportation equipment	4,800	3,700	17,400
Machinery, except electrical	3,000	2,900	3,200
All other durable goods	4,400	4,600	3,000
Total, durable goods	82,100	80,600	72,000
Food & kindred products	17,400	19,800	19,600
Textile-mill products	3,900	3,800	3,300
Apparel & other finished fabrics	2,900	22,800	2,400
Paper & allied products	4,700	4,700	4,200
Printing & publishing	4,500	4,400	4,100
All other nondurable goods	2,900	3,000	2,800
Total, nondurable goods	36,300	38,500	36,400

PORTLAND FOOD PRICE INDEX

Jan. 15, 1947

(Source: San Francisco Regional Office, Bureau of Labor Statistics)

Average food prices in Portland dropped 1.6 per cent between mid-December and mid-January, with lower prices for eggs, fresh fruits and vegetables, dairy products, and fats and oils. These decreases more than offset price increases for meats, cereal and bakery products, beverages, and sugar. Butter dropped to 80 cents a pound (a 9 cent decline), oranges to 40 cents a dozen (down 26 per cent), bacon to 75 cents (down 6 per cent). Higher prices were noted for roundsteak (up 8 per cent), flour and coffee (up 3 per cent), and sugar (up 2 per cent). Readings of the index at various dates are given below:

1935-39 Av.	*Dec. 15, 1941*	*Aug. 15, 1945*	*Jan. 15, 1947*
100.00	121.3	150.9	192.8